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RECOGNIZING THE 2011 UNITED KINGDOM RIOTS AS POLITICAL PROTEST  
A Theoretical Framework Based on Agency, Habitus and the Preconscious  
Sadiya Akram  
Drawing on the 2011 United Kingdom riots, this article explores contestation over the meaning of 
riots. Is rioting criminality and looting, or are there political aspects to the act? For those 
advocating a political element, there is difficulty in reconciling how an apparently spontaneous 
act can have political motivations. This article argues that rioting is a distinctly political action, 
and in order to understand it we must theorize the characteristics of agency that underpin the act. 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s habitus, but developing it to include a preconscious component, the article 
develops a novel theoretical framework for understanding the rioter. Habitus is presented as a 
mechanism that can help better understand how experiences in the past affect the rioter’s present, 
thereby leading to a coming to the surface of underlying political grievances.  
Keywords: rioting, agency, habitus, preconscious, Bourdieu  
Introduction  
In 2011, there was rioting in various United Kingdom cities, including in London and Birmingham. 
These occurred against a backdrop in which riots had taken place in 2005 (Birmingham), 2001 
(Oldham, Burnley, Bradford) and 1981 (Tottenham, Brixton and Handsworth). Despite the relative 
frequency of riots in the United Kingdom, there is much contestation about what riots are and what 
motivates rioters to act in the way that they do. For some, most notably the media and politicians, 
rioters are bored youth who engage in opportunistic crime and violence (Clarke 2011) and, indeed, 
we know that, in the case of the United Kingdom riots of 2011, there was $200 million worth of 
damage (Barentsen 2013) and 2,500 shops were looted (Treadwell et al. 2012; Barentsen 2013). 
For others, rioters are marginalized subjects whose actions are symptomatic of a post-political 
climate, where political solidarity and action are replaced with rampant consumerism (Treadwell 
et al. 2012; Fitzgibbon 2013). However, we also know that, of the 1,344 people who appeared 
before the courts following the 2011 riots, 78 per cent were on the Department of Work and 
Pension’s National Benefits Database (Berman 2011). Further, these individuals were more likely 
to come from deprived areas, had below-average levels of education and higher-than-average 
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levels of unemployment and free school meals (Berman 2011). Historically, rioting has largely 
been the preserve of such groups and often involves ethnic minorities, as can be seen in the 2011 
United Kingdom riots (Birbalsingh 2011; Barentsen 2013). From this perspective, one might see 
rioting as a form of political protest in response to structural inequality.  
Of course, for scholars who emphasize the political aspect of rioting, there are a number of issues, 
which make this thesis difficult to sustain. First, what are the rioters’ motivations and grievances 
and, if they are not clearly articulated, how can we know of them? Second, how can an act that is 
largely spontaneous result from concrete grievances and demands? Third, how do you reconcile 
looting and criminality with legitimate protest? In this context, the literature arguing that there are 
political aspects to rioting has struggled to answer these questions and has reached an impasse, 
given it wants to argue that grievances are being expressed, but lacks the language or concepts to 
do so. In this article, I argue that rioting is a form of political protest and delineate a theoretical 
frame, which would help to address these questions. Specifically, I suggest that the rioter’s political 
motivations and grievances are located in her habitus (Bourdieu 1977), with the riot representing 
a rupture of the habitus. Habitus is offered as a device for understanding how the agent’s life 
experiences collect, reinforce and inform everyday practice in a seamlessly mundane and 
preconscious way. The key point here is that, because of the spontaneous and unorganized nature 
of these acts, and the fact that it is difficult, but not impossible, to change one’s habitus, the 
potential of the riot may be unfulfilled. As such, I draw attention to the nascent political aspects of 
the riot, which are often obscured by a focus on criminality and looting, without denying that the 
latter play a role. My aim here is not to argue that all rioters are political actors, or to deny the 
negative impact of looting or criminality, but to show how there are spaces for politics in this act 
that deserve to be acknowledged. Recognizing rioting as political is important, because denying 
these political aspects risks obscuring and recognizing a form of action, which represents protest 
by individuals against structural inequality. I suggest that recognizing the politics of rioting 
depends on a re-conceptualization of: what ‘the political’ is; how agents engage in politics; and 
their reasons for rioting. These three questions form the key foci of this article.  
Locating rioters within the particular social and structural spaces in which they operate represents 
an important advance in understanding rioting and implicitly draws on structure/agency debates 
(Keith 1993; Waddington 2010). However, the rioting literature has only superficially engaged 
with this literature and would benefit from a more in-depth analysis. In particular, the rioting 
literature has taken very little account of recent developments in the conceptualization of agency, 
which could enhance our understanding of the rioter. We can gain a better understanding of rioting, 
as politically motivated action, if we draw insights from Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and, in 
particular, its preconscious aspects. This frame enables us to locate the rioter within the particular 
structural conditions they occupy and understand how action is informed and framed by this 
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context. From this perspective, habitus helps us to explain how preconscious grievances stemming 
from the individual’s life experiences, be they to do with experiences of social deprivation or 
antagonistic relations with the police, rise to the surface in the riot, in an apparently spontaneous 
manner.  
This article is divided into four sections. I begin by discussing definitions of politics and political 
action, and outline an understanding of politics, which provides a backdrop to the interpretation of 
rioting defended in this article. Next, I turn to the extant literature on rioting, focusing particularly 
on accounts which highlight the agential and structural factors that inform the act, and identify the 
developments in, and limitations of, this literature. Next, the article develops its theoretical frame 
for under- standing rioters, based on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, whilst also making a case for 
its neglected preconscious element. The final section focuses on conceptualizing change in habitus, 
which provides a basis for understanding why and how underlying preconscious grievances 
emerge within the riot.  
Defining the Political  
What does it mean to describe rioters as political actors and riots as political and, moreover, why 
is it important to do so? The starting point of this article is the contestation about what riots are 
and why rioters act in the way they do. Ascribing political identity to riots involves making certain 
claims about the rioters and the act that are clearly different than claims that the acts involve 
criminality or looting. Certainly, those who see criminality in these acts do not also see political 
behaviour. Further, we know that rioting is clearly different to taking part in a protest—a more 
recognizably political act. In order to understand rioting as political, we must first broaden our 
definition of politics and of the political. On this view, politics should not be confined to a narrow 
‘arena’ definition of politics, which focuses on formal political actors, institutions or the state, but 
should be concerned with ‘process’ definitions, which are concerned with the ‘(uneven) 
distribution of power, wealth and resources’, which may occur in a range of institutional and social 
environments (Hay 2002; 2007: 73; Leftwich 2004). This argument has often been made by 
feminists, who argue that the private domestic sphere should be recognized as political; here, 
power relations operate to create negative outcomes for women, such as domestic labour not being 
valued as work. More recently, we see this argument being made in relation to alternative forms 
of political participation, such as online mobilization or social movements, which attempt to 
broaden out definition of legitimate spaces for political action. As these examples illustrate, 
politics involves an uneven distribution of power, wealth and resources, which may, or may not, 
be (explicitly) contested, yet recognizing them as political suggests recognition of an inequality or 
demand. Let me expand.  
On such a definition, the political is seen as an aspect, or moment, of the social, which may be 
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articulated with other moments, such as the economic or the cultural (Hay 2007: 75). Westminster 
or formal political arenas are not excluded from such a definition, but the important point is 
recognition that politics has the potential to exist in all social relations. So, are all social relations 
political? This clearly cannot be the case, because this would make the political an empty concept. 
The social is political where there is ‘(uneven) distribution of power, wealth and resources’ that 
does not occur in all social relations, but will in some, which can therefore be described as being 
political. The key issue here is to recognize the diversity within this non-formal space and I want 
to argue that it should also include rioting, which, of course, would perhaps be contested by others 
occupying this space.  
An alternative view of framing the political and of understanding the riots is that presented by the 
post-political thesis. This thesis is theoretically sophisticated, drawing from the political theories 
of, most prominently, Mouffe (2005), Žižek (1999a; 1999b; 2011) and Ranciére (1999), as well 
as being empirically rich and nuanced. This position is premised on a critique of the emergence in 
the post-Cold War period of a politics of ideological consensus based on the acceptance of the 
capitalist market and the liberal state as the inevitable organizational foundations of society. 
Instead of aiming for consensus, Mouffe argues that democratic theorists and politicians should 
aim for the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of contestation ‘where different 
hegemonic political projects can be confronted’ (2005: 3). On this view, a consensual approach, 
instead of creating the conditions for a reconciled society, leads to the emergence of antagonisms 
that an agonistic perspective, by providing those conflicts with legitimate forms of expression, 
would have managed to avoid. This inherent antagonism is considered to be constitutive of the 
political. Proper politics, from this perspective, is seen as the institution of radical, active equality, 
whilst politics today, on the other hand, is post-political because it is reduced to social 
administration, a ‘politics of self’ and a new ‘politics of conduct’, that forecloses the possibility 
for truly political praxes to emerge.  
From such a perspective, the riots of 2011 exhibit ‘post-political’ tendencies, in the sense that, 
while there may be aspects of resistance, it is subsumed under an over- arching ideological 
framework of neo-liberalism, from which individuals are unable to develop sustained forms of 
critique or ‘resistance’. For Treadwell et al. (2012), the riots exhibit post-political tendencies and, 
therefore, cannot be political because ‘There is a total absence of an alternative culture with 
anything like the same allure that might reanimate political being and recruit it to the cause of 
social justice’ (2012: 8).  
Treadwell et al. recognize that a political moment was present in the initial trigger event, the 
shooting of Mark Duggan in the United Kingdom riots of 2011, but this is seen to dissolve quickly 
as the riots progress into looting and acts of consumerism— acts which reflect the rioter’s 
absorption into neo-liberal ideology. However, in viewing contemporary forms of protest 
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specifically as post-political, the concept of post-politics arguably serves to blunt, rather than 
sharpen, our capacity to critically interrogate con- temporary forms of protest, and their 
relationship to inequality. Moreover, the concept of post-politics provides an unnecessarily 
traditionalist and unrealistic account of what constitutes ‘political action’, as well as a monolithic 
account of ‘neo-liberalism’. In what follows, I show that rioting can be better characterized as an 
emergent form of politics that contests inequalities in a way which cannot usefully be explained 
under the banner of ‘neo-liberalism’. The concept of post-politics, then, ultimately obscures, rather 
than helps, our understanding of emergent forms of protest.  
As the discussion thus far shows, one’s conception of politics and the political frames how one 
understands rioting. Operating with a broader definition of political action enables us to recognize 
the ‘(uneven) distribution of power, wealth and resources’ which characterized the rioters lives, 
and thereby gave them cause to riot. In the next section, I consider how the extant literature has 
theorized riots and rioters and identify some broad trends and some recurrent problems in this 
literature, which could be addressed through a greater engagement with the concept of agency.  
Rioting: Criminal, Political or Post-Political Act?  
Rioting has variously been understood as: criminal behaviour by bored and inactive youth (Jahoda 
1982); community insurrections (Gilroy 1987/1992); and the power of the crowd mind (Le Bon 
1968/1897; Tarde 1903/2011). Accounts of rioting also differ in terms of the emphasis they place 
on spontaneity, irrationality, political motivations, violence and criminality—factors which 
presuppose particular conceptions of agency. For those who argue that rioting is spontaneous, but 
includes political motivations, there is a significant problem in explaining how these agential 
capacities co-exist in riots. The lack of organization in riots also serves to depoliticize the act.  
The existing accounts of rioting have mainly developed in response to actual riots and, therefore, 
developed chronologically following new riots (Gilroy 1987/1992; Keith 1993; Bagguley and 
Hussain 2008), and through official reports (Kerner Report 1968/1988; Scarman 1981; Cantle 
2001). There have also been attempts to develop a broader framework (Smelser 1962; Waddington 
2010). There have been important shifts in this latter literature, most notably a move away from 
explanations of rioting in terms of a ‘crowd mind’ towards ones which acknowledge the 
importance of context and the political grievances of rioters. This section of the article identifies 
some conceptual distinctions in the literature on rioting, highlighting how, at various points, it has 
been overly structuralist and too focused on attributing causal blame. The more recent literature 
recognizes the importance of focusing on individuals and their het- erogeneity in the crowd; 
however, it fails to theorize agency—a move which could sig- nificantly help us understand this 
complex action.  
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The early literature on rioting draws on social psychology and explains rioting through reference 
to crowd psychology (Le Bon 1968/1897; Tarde 1903/2011; Reicher 2001; Drury and Stott 2011). 
According to this position, individuals in the crowd develop group characteristics, which act as a 
mechanism for collective violence. This approach has been heavily criticized for reifying and 
essentializing the crowd and for ignoring the heterogeneity and complexity of individuals involved 
in rioting (Keith 1993; Bagguley and Hussain 2008). Borch’s (2005; 2006) article on the 2005 
riots in France and the work of Toews (2003), Reicher (2001) and Drury and Stott (2011) offer 
recent defences of this position. Essentially, this approach is problematic at both an analytical and 
a normative level, because it fails to explain the actions of individuals involved and privileges the 
accounts of the powerful, be they politicians or journalists, who often perpetuate the discourse 
about a riotous crowd (Bagguley and Hussain 2008). Whilst the crowd, as a collective object, may 
have some effect on individuals, it is important to recognize that crowds are made up of individuals 
and ‘the crowd’ does not have unique characteristics of its own.  
In Rude’s (1981) work, we see a historian’s attempt to add ‘faces to the crowd’ through an 
examination of the historical context and the actual participants in the riot. Documenting the 
demography of the crowd, its social origins, ages, occupations and politics (considering who, or 
what, they are attacking as indicators of political motivations), are considered important in this 
approach. Rude also notes the response of the police and focuses upon who was active and who 
passive in the riot. This approach is generally recognized as an important development in the 
literature, as it goes some way to restoring agency, heterogeneity and complexity to the crowd. 
Indeed, Bagguley and Hussain (2008) are heavily dependent upon Rude in their study of the 
Bradford riots of 2001. Rude brings the issue of agency and context to the fore and, although his 
description of agency is largely descriptive, it succeeds in adding faces, where before there was 
only a crowd.  
Waddington’s multivariate analysis is based on his Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder, which 
attaches great importance to the highly emotive ‘flashpoint’ incidents or events that serve as 
immediate catalysts for wider disorder (Waddington 2008; 2010). This approach also highlights 
the importance of six other levels of analysis: structural; cultural; political/ideological; contextual; 
situational; and interactional. In his more recent work, Waddington (2010) has also highlighted 
the institutional/organizational setting within which riots occur as an important seventh factor in 
the analysis of riots. Keith (1993) welcomes contextualizing descriptive typologies, such as 
Waddington’s, but warns against the dangers of reification of disorders as diverse as football 
hooliganism, industrial strife and civil unrest and the neglect of the ‘complexity of individual 
intentions’ in this approach (Keith 1993: 81)—a point which is also echoed by Bagguley and 
Hussain (2008). Waddington’s typology is important in terms of identifying the context of the riot; 
however, as Keith argues, this account would benefit from paying more attention to the individuals 
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involved.  
Keith’s work on the 1981 riots goes the furthest in developing an account of agency, which 
acknowledges the role of social structures. His approach emphasizes the importance of the trigger 
incident in the context of wider social relations. Keith is highly critical of a ‘recipe mode of 
analysis’ of riots, which, in a Humean fashion, attempts to identify different causal elements in the 
riot, in order to apportion blame. This approach can be seen in all of the official reports following 
the riots: Kerner Report (1968/1988), Scarman (1981) and Cantle (2001). Keith highlights the 
importance of the spaces in which riots take place and how the triggering events resound with 
symbolic and historical significance, when considered in relation to the histories and relations 
between the communities and police in the spaces where the riots occur.  
A further compelling account of the riots, which many have turned to in the con- text of recent 
riots in the United Kingdom in 2011, is that put forward by advocates of the post-political thesis 
(Bauman 2011; Moxon 2011; Žižek 2011; Treadwell et al. 2012), which was introduced earlier in 
the article. According to Treadwell et al. (2012), the rioters in the United Kingdom’s 2011 riots 
exist in a post-political world where there is no longer any discernable political project and, in 
such a scenario, rioters, much like other ‘dissatisfied subjects’, ‘had nowhere to go but the shops’ 
(Treadwell et al. 2012: 1). For Moxon (2011), rather than signalling any breakdown in the norms 
of society, the United Kingdom riots of 2011 reflect conformity to the underlying values of 
consumer culture. This literature recognizes the impact of broader social structural factors, such 
as unemployment, racism and marginalization that affect the rioters lives. However, the thesis here 
is that, in the context of a neo-liberal ideology where consumerism domi- nates, it is a culture of 
excessive and selfish consumerist ideology which provides the dominant motivation for rioters.  
Treadwell et al.’s (2012) account provides an explanation of why riots end the way they do—
namely in looting and criminality. One issue with this account, however, is that all rioters are tarred 
with the same brush, so everyone is denied political efficacy and there is no account of variations 
in actors’ motivations for rioting. Further, whilst this perspective does acknowledge the small act 
of resistance that is present in the riot at the trigger stage, which, in the case of the 2011 United 
Kingdom riots, involved protest against the shooting of Mark Duggan, it fails to explore or 
understand the reasons why this trigger event does not lead to further protest. Instead, the focus, 
from this perspective, is only on the looting and criminality that also characterize this act. Through 
a discussion of habitus and how it operates, I show that the riot, at the trigger stage and beyond, 
represents a protest by individuals, although this may be unfulfilled and the act may end in looting 
or criminality. Such a view requires recognition that rioters, and the conditions of their domination, 
are deeply embedded and difficult to change, because it involves challenging a highly connected 
inter-web of inequality and domination. This is not matter of saying that rioters do not have any 
agency or power to change their lives; rather, in Bourdieu’s terms, it is a question of arguing that 
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it is very difficult to do so.  
Grievances relating to poverty, exclusion and structural inequality are acknowledged in some of 
the literature on rioting (Keith 1993; Waddington 2008; 2010). However, the accounts often 
struggle to link these to political motivations for rioting, or to explain why riots end in criminality 
or the loss and obscuring of the trigger issues which initiate the riot. Of course, responsibility for 
this could lie with the media, the police or the state, or, perhaps, as social scientists we lack the 
language or the concepts to better understand and explain this action.  
In the work of Rude (1981), Keith (1993) and Bagguley and Hussain (2008), we see a clear move 
towards focusing on individual rioters and their motivations. This move towards agency is 
certainly to be welcomed. However, it runs into difficulties because it stops short of developing an 
understanding of agency at the level of ontology and thinking about the unique characteristics of 
agency which may help us to better under- stand how grievances and motivations operate. The 
other notable trend in the literature on rioting is towards recognition of the importance of context 
or structure, which is emphasized, in particular, by Waddington (2010) and Keith (1993). This is 
also an important observation, and the remainder of the article builds on both of these 
developments to offer an interpretation of rioting, which brings together a contextual and an 
agency-based approach. However, before I do this, I discuss the concepts of ‘motivation’ and 
‘grievance’, which will inform the discussion of habitus later in the paper.  
The Search for Political Motivations and Grievances  
It is difficult to deny that grievances, about social deprivation, limited employment opportunities, 
racism and segregation, and the political motivations associated with them, are of concern to 
rioters. This is particularly so given that the riots considered here have occurred in areas with large 
ethnic minority populations, disproportionately affected by socio-economic inequalities (Keith 
1993; Amin 2002; Tilly 2003; Bagguley and Hussain 2008; Waddington 2010;). However, if we 
accept that rioters are politically motivated, the central dilemma in explaining rioting is the tension 
between the spontaneity of the act and the lack of an explicit political strategy expressed by those 
involved, given that an articulated political strategy usually involves considered and organized 
actions (Akram 2009).  
Gilroy suggests that rioting should be seen as a ‘long term strategic war of position’. However, he 
fails to explain how ‘long-term strategies’ combine with spontaneous actions (Gilroy 1987/1992: 
233). In a similar vein, Keith (1993) argues that, unless we can address the impromptu nature of 
rioting, we cannot account theoretically for what occurs during a riot. As such, in response to 
accounts which privilege the irrationality of rioters, Keith describes rioting as ‘spontaneous 
rationality’ and distinguishes the riot from ‘self-conscious deliberate strategy’ (Keith 1993: 185). 
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Unfortunately, his approach reaches an impasse, because he argues that there is ‘seemingly 
irreconcilable mix of violence, looting and strategy’ (Keith 1993: 186). Despite these attempts to 
explain and link rioters’ grievances to political motivations, such accounts ultimately struggle to 
make the link between grievances and political motivations—clearly the crucial issue.  
Identifying political motivations for riots is a complex task, given that much of the literature 
describes rioters as irrational (Jahoda 1982: 96–7), whilst those who attribute rationality to the 
rioters struggle with the apparent spontaneity of the riot (Keith 1993; Horowitz 2003; Waddington 
2010). The focus on rationality in this discussion is telling, because it points to the way in which 
Political Science legitimates forms of political behaviour, given that rationality is associated with 
conventional forms of strategic political action. The ‘emotional’ elements of the riot also serve to 
strengthen claims about the irrationality of the action, as does a focus upon the criminality and 
violence involved (Keith 1993).  
The extant literature on rioting also struggles to explain the apparent spontaneity of the riot. A 
focus on this issue is also important because it points to the need to explain how, in situations of 
relative stability, agents act and react in a relatively unorganized and unexpected way. This issue 
highlights the importance of theorizing change in agency—a limitation of the existing literature 
on rioting.  
Of course, some rioters may express political motivations for their actions, whilst others may not, 
and it is important to acknowledge this variability. Notwithstanding this point, these accounts are 
often given in the heat of the action and actors may not have fully processed the reasons for their 
actions. This issue is echoed by Treadwell et al. (2012), who argue that direct questions to rioters 
may yield either defensive justifications or answers that reveal only the more superficial aspects 
of the complex overall set of emotions. It is important to emphasize that this article is not an 
argument for undermining the autonomy of the actors involved in rioting and that any analysis of 
rioting must start with rioters’ account of events. However, it is also important to point out that we 
must go beyond these initial accounts of rioting to explore the full range of motivations that inform 
it, because the rioter may find it difficult to access these motivations in the immediate context of 
the riot. Given the spontaneity of rioting, it is plausible that actors will not have processed the full 
range of motivations that inform their actions. Rioting, therefore, is a unique form of political 
action, which requires an in-depth engagement with rioters both during and after the riot, if we are 
to understand how political motivations inform this action.  
Defining motivations and grievances  
Before we proceed, let us be clear about what ‘motive’ and ‘grievance’ mean. Motives are 
something ‘that cause a person to act in a certain way’, such that they may be thought of as the 
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reasons for people’s actions (Oxford Dictionary 2013). Motives, then, can be seen to inform action 
because they lead to them. Motives can be known to the individual, so, for example, my motivation 
for running for the bus is that, if I do not, I may miss it and will be late for work. Alternatively, 
motives may exist in a dormant state, until prompted by an event or trigger of some sort. These 
motives can be linked to grievances. So, an individual may not have previously reflected on long-
standing negative community relations with the police, because this is just an everyday part of 
their life, but these issues come to the fore once an event like the shooting of Mark Duggan occurs. 
I discuss habitus in more detail below, but it is important to point out that this latter understanding 
of motives draws on habitus, in that we know that habitus can remain relatively stable until there 
is a rupture, which causes the individual to either reassess and change their habitus or remain with 
their former habitus. The account of rioting developed here asks us to consider the possibility that 
motivations do not need to be articulated to exist, but exist in the habitus nonetheless. From such 
a perspective, lack of articulated political motivations should not be seen as a sign of their absence.  
Grievances, on the other hand, involve ‘a wrong considered as grounds for complaint, or something 
believed to cause distress’ (Oxford Dictionary 2013). The wrongs referred to here would relate to 
unemployment, poverty and social deprivation as experienced by the individuals engaged in the 
rioting. Grievances may refer to single events, such as a particular incident with the police. 
Understood in the context of the habitus, grievances may also draw on various memories and 
experiences over a life course. Given the capacity of the habitus to collect and consolidate such 
experiences, it is reasonable to think a grievance towards the police may draw on various 
memories, which may, or may not, be accessible to the agent in the event of the riot, but which 
cumulatively translate as a grievance. In rioting, there is a clear relationship between motives and 
grievances, because grievances may provide motivations for rioting. We can go one step further 
than this to suggest that motivations can become political motivations when actors decide to protest 
against such grievances.  
Returning to the question raised earlier about how we can identify motivations for the riot if they 
are not articulated, this approach provides political motivations for the riot because it shows how 
grievances and motivations are stored until they are triggered in the rioter’s habitus. This means 
that, whilst individuals may have concerns about issues, they may not feel able to do anything 
about them, or there are few channels to do so. However, the riot, or its triggering events, represents 
an opportunity for stored grievances to be expressed, because the riot represents a rupture in the 
habitus. The storing of grievances or motivations is an important part of the process, because it 
suggests that motivations and grievances remain dormant in habitus—un-activated, as it were—
until there is an opportunity for them to be expressed.  
Once the rupture or riot occurs, motivations and grievances may not necessarily be articulated or 
translate into recognizable political actions, such as in recognized forms of protest, but we must 
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recognize the rupture involved in the act, and its political potential. Of course, the political 
potential of these acts may not be at all fulfilled, which explains why they often end up as looting 
and criminality. As Bourdieu emphasizes, it is very difficult to change one’s habitus, so, although 
the rioter may have succeeded in rupturing the habitus, following the rupture through to achieve 
change is difficult, but not impossible (McNay 1999; Adkins 2003). The concept of habitus has 
been mentioned multiple times in this article thus far, but without being defined; it comes to the 
fore in the next section.  
A Theoretical Framework for Theorizing Rioters  
In this section, I outline a theoretical frame for understanding rioters. I do this in three stages. First, 
I consider Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and show how it successfully captures the highly 
complex, but mundane, nature of seamless everyday interaction between agents and social 
structures, which I argue should underpin our understanding of rioters. Next, I argue that there are 
preconscious elements of habitus which are integral to its operation. I recognize that both Bourdieu 
and the wider literature on habitus do not deal sufficiently with this aspect and consider why this 
is the case. The third section builds on this theorization of the preconscious habitus to 
conceptualize the rioter. In doing so, I make two key claims: (1) I locate political motivation for 
the riot; and (2) I delineate processes of change in habitus, showing the complexity of change and 
how it can lead to ruptures or crisis in habitus.  
Habitus  
For Bourdieu, our understanding of how to behave and interact on a daily basis as human beings 
is shaped by the habitus:  
... that system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of an express mastery of the operations necessary 
in order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1990b: 5)  
It is from within the habitus then that one learns to live life in a taken-for-granted and routine 
manner. For Bourdieu, it is within the habitus that one deeply learns the doxic nature of one’s 
society—the deeply held and practised, but perhaps not discussed, taken-for-granted which is 
made up of the so many givens in any particular society (Bourdieu 1977).  
Habitus is all-encompassing because it shapes ‘our overall orientation to, or way of being in the 
world; our predisposed way of thinking, acting and moving in and through the social environment 
that encompasses posture, demeanour, outlook, expectations, and tastes’ (Sweetman 2003: 532). 
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Moreover, habitus is the product of an individual’s upbringing and, more particularly, of her class. 
In Bourdieu’s view, habitus brings about a:  
... unique integration, dominated by earliest experiences .... Thus for example, the habitus 
acquired in the family underlies the structuring of school experiences ... and the habitus 
transformed by schooling, itself, diversified, in turn underlies the structuring of all 
subsequent experiences ... and so on, from restructuring to restructuring. (Bourdieu 1977: 
87)  
Agency, if conceptualized as habitus, offers a useful frame for understanding the rioter, because it 
can capture the interplay between structure and agency in a nuanced way, which reflects the reality 
of everyday interaction, or, as Bourdieu prefers to term it, our ‘practice’. Further, habitus offers a 
conceptual mechanism for understanding the interplay and consolidation of the agent’s various 
experiences over their life course. For example, a rioter’s experiences of racism or feelings of 
hopelessness arising from long-term unemployment are stored in the habitus, which is constantly 
evolving ‘from re-structuring to re-structuring’ (Bourdieu 1977: 87). As such, in habitus, we have 
an account of agency which recognizes the impact of social structure, but which also specifies a 
temporal dimension to agency, which can help to trace life experiences in rioters. The unique value 
of habitus is that it emphasizes the importance of Bourdieu’s goal of focusing on the agent’s 
practice, as opposed to the theoretician’s interpretation of the agent’s actions. Agents do not go 
about the world engaging in an explicit way with rules or structures. As such, the fact that they do 
engage with rules and structures requires a different principle of action, hence the habitus.  
The preconscious habitus  
One of the aims of this paper is to argue for a notion of the preconscious in habitus, which is an 
argument that has been made elsewhere (Akram 2012). Neither Bourdieu, nor his critics, address 
this issue in a focused way, which represents a crucial gap in our understanding of how habitus 
operates. As such, in this section, I provide a discussion of the preconscious elements of habitus 
and show how it has the potential to expand our understanding of agential actions and motivations 
and how these are informed by experiences as stored in the habitus. However, I begin with an 
important clarification.  
As will be shown below, Bourdieu makes references to the ‘unconscious’ elements of habitus, as 
indeed does much other literature. The unconscious as a concept has a particular history in 
psychoanalysis, with a meaning which is substantively different from that intended by Bourdieu. 
Indeed, one possible explanation of why Bourdieu neglected to discuss this issue is because of his 
rejection of Freud and psychoanalysis, which permeates all his work (Bourdieu 1977: 92–3; 1999: 
512). Yet, as will be argued below, a notion of the unconscious remains integral to habitus and, in 
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not acknowledging it, we risk not understanding its true potential. Consequently, despite 
Bourdieu’s and others’ references to the ‘unconscious’, this article advocates a notion of the 
preconscious, in order to distance my position from Freud (1927/1962) and psychoanalysis. So, 
this paper suggests that the preconscious refers to that arena of influences that affects agency below 
the level of conscious action.1  
Bourdieu’s texts are peppered with references to the ‘unconscious’ and, more frequently, to how 
actions are ‘not conscious’. As an example, in Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu writes:  
The ‘unconscious’ is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself 
produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of 
habitus .... (Bourdieu 1977: 78–9)  
In addition, many of Bourdieu’s supporters have commented on the unconscious aspects of 
habitus. So, Sweetman (2003) states that ‘(H)abitus is predominantly or wholly pre-reflexive, 
however, a form of second nature, that is both durable and largely unconscious’ (Bourdieu, in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 133, in Sweetman 2003: 532; further references to the unconscious 
aspects of habitus can be found in King 2000; Jenkins 2002; Adkins 2003: 24; Adams 2006: 514; 
Elder-Vass 2007).  
Here, the preconscious is implicated in how habitus functions, although other critics have argued 
that the preconscious elements of habitus reduce conscious actions (King 2000; Jenkins 2002; 
Elder-Vass 2007). As such, Bourdieu, his admirers and his critics all seem to have accepted the 
existence of a preconscious element to habitus, although it receives very little attention in the 
literature. Whilst the preconscious elements are important to how habitus functions, I believe that 
we can go one step further to argue that, in addition to actions occurring as a result of preconscious 
routines embedded in habitus, motivations, including political motivations, can also emerge from 
the preconscious habitus. As such, the issue concerning the preconscious nature of habitus lies at 
the heart of the issue of rioting, in that it is a question about acknowledging that not all motivations 
or grievances must be articulated or enter the discursive realm in order to be recognized as existing. 
Instead, political motivations for rioting are conceptualized as existing at a preconscious level in 
habitus and, thereby, operating as motivations for rioting.  
Conversely, some rioters may articulate reasons and motivations for their actions, but, if rioting is 
																																																						
1	Akram (2012) defends a notion of the unconscious but, in my more recent work, this aspect of habitus is conceptualized as the 
preconscious. A further option is to term this element of habitus as the pre-reflexive, which some of the literature does (Adkins 
2003; McNay 1999). However, this option was abandoned because this highlights reflexivity as the key or normal feature of 
agency, which is to overinflate its importance. Choosing prefixes such as ‘un’, ‘pre’ or ‘sub’ to add to the term ‘conscious’ is 
clearly an important decision as one lends claim to a long history of the concept in psychoanalysis, whilst the others will not. It 
should also be noted that the wider literature also suffers from a lack of clarity in this issue and fluctuates between terms.	
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a response to long-term structural disadvantage, it may be difficult to articulate or even to 
understand the cause of anger and protest within the short time frame of the riot. Further, given 
the spontaneity of the riot, the rioter has limited time and resources to reflect on the act, the range 
of motivations that informs them and how precisely to ensure positive outcomes. However, as 
social scientists, in using habitus, we have a mechanism to peel back through the agent’s life and 
their experiences, to explore motivations and grievances which may lead to the riot. In this vein, 
experiences relating to racism, or other forms of structural deprivation, are conceptualized as 
having an impact on the rioter over the course of their lives. These experiences may impact at both 
a conscious and a preconscious level, as habitus operates across both platforms (Akram 2012). 
However, in the context of understanding the rioter’s behaviour, it is the preconscious arena which 
is of particular relevance.  
Acknowledging the preconscious and unarticulated nature of motivations and, further, the 
routinized nature of everyday life is important, because it stands in stark contrast to accounts which 
conceptualize agency largely in terms of reflexivity, decision making and actors who are 
unaffected by habit or anything below consciousness. This position is particularly reflected in the 
work of Margret Archer (2012) (but see also the de-traditionalization thesis advocated by Giddens 
(1991) and Beck (1992), who has spent much of the last two decades elaborating her conception 
of agency. For Archer, reflexivity is progressively replacing routine action in late modernity, 
particularly in more advanced societies. Unsurprisingly, she is highly critical of Bourdieu’s 
habitus, arguing that it downplays reflexivity (Archer 2012: 75). I am not disputing that reflexivity 
or decision making are important. It is just that the literature holds that it is just one characteristic 
amongst others, and is certainly not the dominant characteristic of agency, as is argued by Archer.  
The impact of the rioter’s past on the present during the riot  
Bourdieu places significant weight on the connection between the agent’s history and their 
‘everyday practice’ (Bourdieu 1977), which is important for identifying political motivations in 
the riot. He suggests that habitus has a hysteresis2 effect, in which the ‘disproportional weight of 
early experience in the generation of embodied dispositions creates a temporal lag in the logic of 
practice’ (Bourdieu 1990a: 59). In effect, as a result of this temporal domain, agency, defined as 
habitus, is capable of encapsulating the whole of an individual’s biography. The preconscious will 
have a critical role to play here, because, as Bourdieu suggests, ‘in each of us, in varying 
proportions, there is a part of yesterday’s man .... Yet, we do not sense this man of the past, because 
he is inveterate in us, he makes up the unconscious part of ourselves’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72). The 
																																																						
2	The term ‘hysteresis’ has its origins in physics and refers to the lag in response exhibited by a body in reacting to changes in the 
forces, especially magnetic forces, affecting it (Oxford English Dictionary 2013).  
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relationship between past and present, and various forms of structural influence, will be the site of 
much overlap, reinforcement and even contradiction. For example, an individual’s habitus might 
contain experiences based on the social structural impact of class, ethnicity, gender and sexuality, 
as well as more particular forms of structural influence, such as an individual’s commitment to 
institutions or particular roles. These experiences from the past provide fertile motivations for 
rioting and, through the notion of hysteresis and a preconscious habitus, we can develop a more 
in-depth account of how these motivations inform rioting. Crucially, it is the preconscious element 
of habitus which enables one to explain why the agent herself may be unaware of how these earlier 
experiences inform current behaviour.  
As a result of the hysteresis effect in the habitus, political motivations for the riot can be identified, 
if the riot is conceptualized as the (end) product of a ‘process’ and not a single ‘event’. This process 
definition of the riot is intimately related to the agent’s history, as contained in the agent’s habitus. 
Long-term and embedded issues related to race/ethnicity may emerge in an apparent spontaneous 
way, but this does not equate to their political motivations being spontaneous and, thus, spurious. 
As such, we must overcome a simple search for agential strategy and intentionality and, instead, 
examine agential political motivations over a longer time period, hence the need for a better 
understanding of change in agency.  
There is another piece in this puzzle which is crucial for understanding the rioter’s habitus, namely 
why the riot occurs at a particular point in time, and whether it will lead to a concerted effort on 
the rioter’s part, to enact change in their life. From my perspective, the riot occurs when it does 
because it represents a rupture in the rioter’s habitus. In other words, the trigger event of a riot 
represents a moment of critical reflection which may, or may not, be seized upon to create positive 
change in one’s life. Creating change, however, is difficult, and the utility of Bourdieu’s habitus 
is that it reflects the difficulty of change. As such, it offers a contrast to theories of reflexivity 
which suggest that we are living in an era where there are constant opportunities to redesign our 
lives and change as we wish. This is an important issue, which is addressed in the next section.  
Rioting as an attempt at changing one’s habitus  
If riots are informed by political motivations, why do rioters choose to express themselves by 
rioting and not in a protest, or through other means of expression, which arguably might be more 
successful? Similarly, if a riot is political, why are riots often isolated and irregular phenomena? 
In order to answer these questions, we must understand the inherent difficulty for rioters in 
acknowledging and addressing the need for broad-ranging change in their lives. Bourdieu is useful 
here because habitus highlights the difficulty of acknowledging and instituting change in one’s 
life, given the deep level at which many structures, norms and habits operate in habitus, and shape 
rioters’ lives. For example, let’s assume the rioters’ grievances result from deeply embedded 
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racism in society, as reflected in growing up in ethnically segregated ghettos, and/ or from long-
term antagonistic relationships with the police. Rioters may be aware of these issues, but acting to 
change them is difficult because the problems are so great. Consequently, rioting represents an 
attempt at change or protest by actors on issues which are ordinarily deeply embedded, so solving 
them may seem like a hopeless task. As such, riots are a successful rupture in the agents’ habitus 
and result from underlying grievances becoming salient. In such a scenario, issues of racism and 
an antagonistic relationship with the police are played out in ways that were not previously 
possible.  
The difficulty of change  
Developing an adequate theory of change, which is reliant on a notion of the preconscious, is 
central to understanding how agency operates and rioting occurs. Because habitus operates on a 
preconscious platform, change is certainly difficult and intentional change even more so. As such, 
the charge of determinism is often directed at Bourdieu (Alexander 1995; Jenkins 2002; Elder-
Vass 2007). However, McNay (1999: 113) suggests that Bourdieu’s work is valuable because it 
demonstrates the difficulty of change: ‘... it provides a corrective to certain theories of reflexive 
transformation which overestimate the extent to which individuals are able to reshape identity’ 
(see also Adkins 2003; Sweetman 2003; Adams 2006;). In an era of ‘identity mobility’ (Giddens 
1991), where agents are said to be engaging in lifestyle choices, we see that, at a pre- conscious 
level, class, gender and ethnicity structures are enduring, despite outward attempts by agents to 
change lifestyles. Habitus draws attention to norms that operate below the level of consciousness. 
As such, we might suggest that it will take more than a simple ‘act of will’ to resist, or change, 
norms and, as McNay states, ‘no matter how many levels of consciousness one reaches, the 
problems always go deeper’ (McNay 1999). In this vein, whilst the rioter may want to change her 
life, taking positive steps in this regard is an inherently difficult task, as it will involve making 
changes in a range of fields, such as in access to education, housing and employment. The existing 
literature examining the demographic background of rioters confirms this analysis (Keith 1993; 
Amin 2002).  
Whilst change in habitus is difficult, it is not impossible and it is a continuous pro- cess. Bourdieu 
suggests that change is not only possible; it is ‘always already’ in progress (Bourdieu 2000: 235). 
However, it is change within the limits of the structures and expressions of the habitus. The more 
unstable the habitus, the more it is con- fronted with novel situations and agents and, thus, the 
broader the scope of change, or the greater the ‘margin of freedom’ for invention (Bourdieu 2000: 
235). Disruptions and ‘interventions’ in the habitus occur in at least two ways: changing 
circumstances in the habitus, such as a crisis ‘make dispositions dysfunction’; and dispositions 
may also ‘waste away or weaken through lack of use’ (Bourdieu 2000: 160). In other words, the 
habitus ‘changes constantly in response to new experiences’ (Bourdieu 2000: 161). This approach 
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to change provides a useful lens with which to conceptualize underlying struggles in habitus, which 
emerge during the riot, as a result of either disruptions or interventions in habitus. The trigger event 
in a riot, such as the shooting of Mark Duggan in the 2011 riots in the United Kingdom, functions 
as a disruption or intervention in habitus. On this understanding, what may appear to be 
spontaneous action is, in fact, the underlying struggle within the habitus coming to the surface. As 
such, the rioters’ grievances operate at the level of the preconscious, until they become visible 
during the riot, which leads to change and a possible new settlement in the habitus.  
 
In Conclusion  
Having discussed Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and shown how this provides a useful mechanism 
for understanding how underlying grievances and motivations are stored in the habitus until they 
find an outing in the riot, we can now draw together the insights from this article and present some 
concluding thoughts.  
The study of rioting, as it currently stands, offers various accounts of the act, most notably in the 
form of the post-political thesis (Treadwell et al. 2012) or in the work of Waddington (2010) or 
Keith (1993). Yet, for those who recognize a political element to rioting, there are limited 
explanations of how to understand this spontaneous act, which often involves elements of 
criminality and looting. This lack of clarity also impacts on how wider society and the media 
respond to riots. In highlighting the importance of a theorization of agency to this debate, which 
is premised on Bourdieu’s preconscious habitus, I show that rioting can be a distinctly political 
action, where politics is defined as involving an unequal distribution of power, wealth and 
resources. A related key finding is that motivations and grievances do not have to be articulated to 
exist. Whilst they may be articulated, their existence is not dependent upon articulation. Crucially, 
it is only through understanding how habitus operates that one can arrive at this understanding.  
Through providing an account of how change occurs in the preconscious habitus, this article 
explored the difficulty of creating change in one’s life, and the inherent difficulties rioters face in 
addressing the issues which constrain their lives. The broader point here is that, whilst the riot 
represents a rupture of the habitus, and a partial airing of issues, there are few positive outcomes 
from riots, as is reflected in the high numbers of arrests which usually follow (Berman 2011). This 
is not only because rioting is characterized by looting and violence, but also because rioters are 
often unorganized and may be unclear about what their shared aims are. Rioting, then, is a form of 
protest, but it should be acknowledged that its fraught nature reveals the complexity of instituting 
change in one’s life.  
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As part of my argument, I highlight the neglect of the preconscious in habitus. Incorporating this 
aspect of agency broadens the scope of social and political analysis, because it enables the social 
scientist to probe motivations, or what may appear to be a lack of motivations, for actions. Further, 
it helps us to recognize the existence of deep- seated motivations, which cannot be explained 
through intentionality or an explicit articulation of reasons for actions. Such a concept could 
significantly enhance research into rioting. Notwithstanding this, any analysis of rioters’ 
motivations needs to begin with an analysis of the rioters’ understanding of, and explanations for, 
their behaviour. This paper is not arguing that there is no agential autonomy, as this would be 
indefensible. Instead, I advocate a theoretically informed and more nuanced approach to how we 
understand rioters and their accounts of rioting. Simply posing direct questions to rioters during, 
or immediately after, the riot about their motivations regarding such a complex issue is unlikely to 
encourage genuine self-analysis or allow enough time to enable the interviewer to encourage such 
analysis. In such a scenario, the accounts received may be defensive or self-justificatory and 
lacking in detailed consideration of the act or the motivations that led to it. Whilst these accounts 
can be important and revealing, in order to understand rioting, we must look deeper for 
motivations, through an exploration of the agent’s preconscious habitus, which can be accessed 
using a detailed qualitative analysis of habitus, but also necessitates a broader social structural 
analysis.  
One final point is important. If it is accepted that the preconscious habitus is important for 
understanding rioting, then this must be acknowledged in both theoretical and methodological 
discussions (Akram 2014). The main aim here has been to open this issue for discussion. However, 
an important next step is to discuss the methodological implications of the concept of agency 
advocated here and how this can be utilized in research into rioting. Rioters are a notoriously 
difficult group to access and the theoretical approach developed in this article would require 
significant time and resources, making this task even more difficult. This is a challenge with which 
the social sciences must deal, if we are to better understand rioters and help to address their 
grievances.  
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